The United States Should Establish Normal Trade Relations with Russia by Anders Aslund & Gary Clyde Hufbauer
N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 2 0   N o v e m b e r   2 0 1 1
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW     Washington, DC 20036     Tel 202.328.9000     Fax 202.659.3225     www.piie.com
Policy Brief
The United States Should 
Establish Permanent Normal 
Trade Relations with Russia
Anders Åslund and Gary Clyde Hufbauer
Anders Åslund is a leading specialist on postcommunist economic trans-
formation with more than 30 years of experience in the field. Among his 
recent books are Russia after the Global Economic Crisis (2010), The 
Russia  Balance  Sheet  (2009),  Russia’s  Capitalist  Revolution:  Why 
Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed (2007), and How 
Capitalism Was Built (2007). Åslund joined the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics as senior fellow in 2006. He has worked as an 
economic adviser to the Russian government (1991–94), to the Ukrainian 
government  (1994–97),  and  to  the  president  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic. 
Before joining the Peterson Institute he was the director of the Russian 
and  Eurasian  Program  at  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International 
Peace, and he codirected the Carnegie Moscow Center’s project on Post-
Soviet Economies. Previously, he served as a Swedish diplomat in Kuwait, 
Geneva, Poland, Moscow, and Stockholm. From 1989 until 1994, he was 
professor and founding director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition 
Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics. He earned his doctorate 
from the University of Oxford. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Reginald Jones 
Senior Fellow since 1992, was the Maurice Greenberg Chair and Director 
of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (1996–98), the Marcus 
Wallenberg Professor of International Finance Diplomacy at Georgetown 
University (1985–92), senior fellow at the Institute (1981–85), deputy 
director  of  the  International  Law  Institute  at  Georgetown  University 
(1979–81), deputy assistant secretary for international trade and invest-
ment policy of the US Treasury (1977–79), and director of the interna-
tional tax staff at the Treasury (1974–76). He has written extensively 
on international trade, investment, and tax issues. Among his numerous 
books are Figuring Out the Doha Round (2010), Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered,  3d  ed.  (2007),  Toward  a  US-Indonesia  Free  Trade 
Agreement (2007), and US-China Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising 
Stakes (2006). 
Note: The authors want to thank Fred Bergsten, Steve Weisman, Jeffrey 
Schott, and Randi Levinas for many useful comments, Julia Muir for excel-
lent research assistance and Madona Devasahayam for eminent editing.
© Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved.
After 18 years, Russia is finally on the verge of acceding to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). No country has struggled 
for so long to become a member of this important organiza-
tion. The last impediment was removed on November 9, when 
Russia and Georgia concluded an agreement on monitoring 
trade flows across their disputed border. The WTO Working 
Party, which oversaw the negotiations, then approved Russian 
accession  on  November  10,  clearing  the  way  for  formal 
membership to be adopted at the WTO ministerial confer-
ence to be held December 15–17, 2011 (WTO 2011). 
Russia is the last of the Group of Twenty (G-20) countries 
to join the WTO. Its entry will strengthen the global trading 
system  and  yield  potentially  large  benefits  to  the  United 
States. A major question remains for Washington, however. 
Will the United States act to take full advantage—or will it 
allow  other  countries  to  seize  opportunities  that  slip  from 
American hands?
Russia’s joining the WTO does not require any US legis-
lative action. All conditions for Russia’s accession have been 
settled. The Russian State Duma has until June 15, 2012 to 
ratify its accession. Thirty days after Russia’s notification to 
the WTO of its ratification, Russia will become the 154th 
member of the WTO. 
However, US benefits of Russia’s accession to the WTO are 
not automatic. They will  materialize only if the United States 
Congress grants permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) 
status to Russia—by repealing application to Russia of the 
37-year-old  Jackson-Vanik  Amendment,  which  bars  favor-
able trade relations with countries that restrict emigration.   
President  Barack  Obama,  in  a  statement  issued  November 
10 after the Working Party’s preliminary approval of Russian 
accession, said he looked forward to working with Congress 
“to end the application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to 
Russia in order to ensure that American firms and American 
exporters  will  enjoy  the  same  benefits  of  Russian  WTO 
membership as their international competitors.” 
It is imperative that Congress respond constructively in 
the  same  spirit  of  bipartisanship  that  led  to  the  successful 
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trade accords. Political wrangling, misjudgment, and miscal-
culations must not be allowed to cost the United States a 
significant new source of economic growth and cooperation 
in the future. 
What the United StateS Will Gain from 
GrantinG rUSSia Pntr
The potential benefits to the US economy from Russia’s WTO 
accession  are  substantial  but  the  United  States  can  enjoy 
them only if it grants Russia PNTR. US exports to Russia 
could  double  over  the  next  five  years—from  $9  billion  in 
2010 to $19 billion—adding jobs in the services, agriculture, 
manufacturing, and high-tech sectors. More generally, with 
Russia’s accession to the WTO and the United States granting 
PNTR to Russia, US-Russia commercial relations will be set 
on a sounder and friendlier footing, facilitating cooperation 
on  national  security  and  political  issues.  By  strengthening 
the rules-based global trading system, WTO accession and 
PNTR will discourage Russia from undertaking protectionist 
measures.
The  US  gains  arise  from  solid  growth  in  the  Russian 
economy.  From  1999  until  2008,  Russia’s  gross  domestic 
product grew by an average of 7 percent a year, establishing 
Russia as one of the world’s top ten economies. After contrac-
tion during the financial crisis in 2009, Russia’s growth rate 
seems to have stabilized at a still respectable 3 to 4 percent 
a year. This growth is creating substantial opportunities for 
foreign producers, both in trade and investment, and global 
firms are responding accordingly. Russian imports, exports, 
and inward foreign investment all quadrupled between 2002 
and 2008. Still, Russia ranks only 37th among US export 
markets, suggesting great potential for improvement. 
At present, the governing agreement for trade between 
the United States and Russia is the Bilateral Trade Relations 
Agreement reached in 1991 between the United States and 
what was then the Soviet Union. That agreement provides 
for mutual extension of most favored nation benefits. It was 
adjusted to apply to Russia in 1992 after the Russian Federation 
was established. The bilateral agreement was authorized by 
Section 405 of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974. However, 
this old bilateral agreement covers only part of the trade and 
none of the investment. 
On November 19, 2006, Russia reached a much more 
extensive bilateral agreement with the United States on market 
access conditions for its accession to the WTO. This accord of 
800 pages and various follow-up agreements were a prelude 
to Russia’s accession to the WTO. They contain significant 
concessions of great value to the United States in intellectual 
property and market access conditions for several important 
products: meats, agriculture, biotechnology, harvesters, leased 
aircraft, and goods with encryption technology. Once Russia 
accedes to the WTO, these agreed advantages for US firms 
and farmers will depend on a US congressional vote in favor 
of PNTR. 
From the US point of view, granting Russia PNTR is a 
winning option for both sides. A vote for PNTR will offer 
to Russia, on a permanent and unconditional basis, the same 
trade conditions that the United States grants to other signa-
tories of the WTO. Extending PNTR to Russia entails no 
special favors or privileges; rather PNTR will accord to Russia 
the basic treatment enjoyed by nearly all other US trading 
partners on a permanent and unconditional basis. In turn, the 
United States will gain three major economic advantages:
n  First, PNTR will ensure that the best available trade and 
investment conditions of access to the Russian market 
offered to foreign firms are also offered to US firms. 
n  Second,  estimates  in  our  related  forthcoming  Policy 
Analysis (Åslund and Hufbauer forthcoming) show that 
US exports to Russia could double from $9 billion (in 
2010) to $19 billion. These gains will be realized as the 
obligations of the agreement are phased in; the gains will 
be distributed across the board, from agriculture to manu-
factures  to  services.  In  addition,  econometric  models 
indicate that new US export opportunities will also flow 
from an expansion of US foreign direct investment in 
the Russian economy, highlighting the importance of the 
PNTR vote.
n  Third, WTO accession will require Russia to enact new 
rules on issues ranging from services regulations to inward 
foreign investment to agricultural standards to intellec-
tual property. These rules will bring greater certainty for 
US firms doing business in Russia. Moreover, member-
ship in the WTO requires a country to observe a vast 
fabric of commercial law.
US exports to Russia could double 
over the next five years—from $9 
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But  what  will  happen  to  US  imports  from  Russia? 
Commodities account for 90 percent of Russia’s overall exports 
and this share is even greater in its exports to the United States, 
with refined petroleum products comprising 65 percent and 
various metals most of the rest. These imports into the United 
States are subject to zero or minimal tariffs, and no further 
reduction is foreseen through Russia’s entry into the WTO. 
Therefore, no large rise in US imports from Russia is to be 
expected.  Since  US  imports  of  oil  and  petroleum  products 
have fallen in recent years because of sharply rising domestic 
production and flat consumption, Russia’s exports of petro-
leum products to the United States may actually decline over 
the next few years.
Finally, with PNTR, the United States can invoke the 
WTO dispute settlement provisions in the event Russia fails 
to observe these obligations in its dealings with US firms. 
China is often accused of failing to comply fully with WTO 
norms, but the WTO has a solid record of winning compli-
ance with its standards from many countries, ranging from 
the European Union, Canada, Japan, Brazil, Indonesia, and 
of course the United States itself. In fact, when it loses in the 
WTO, China like other countries typically changes its laws 
and procedures to conform to the WTO ruling (Hufbauer and 
Woollacott 2010). 
Russia’s WTO accession contains many valuable Russian 
commitments.  In  comparison  with  other  emerging-market 
economies, Russia’s import tariffs were not very high to begin 
with, but they are declining significantly. On average, the final 
legally binding tariff ceiling for the Russian Federation will be 
7.8 percent compared with a 2011 average of 10 percent for 
all products. The average tariff ceiling for agricultural products 
will be 10.8 percent, lower than the current average of 13.2 
percent. The ceiling average for manufactured goods will be 
7.3 percent versus the 9.5 percent average today on manu-
factured  imports.  Some  commitments  are  immediate  but 
others are phased in. The longest implementation period is 
eight years for poultry followed by seven years for motor cars, 
helicopters, and civilian aircraft (WTO 2011).
Possible  US  gains  from  Russia’s  WTO  accession  and 
PNTR  on  a  sector-by-sector  and  state-by-state  basis  are 
summarized below. More detail is provided in box 1. 
Agriculture 
Russia is one of the world’s top meat importers and has histori-
cally been the largest importer of US poultry. Russia offers a 
meaningful market for states with a strong agricultural base, 
such as Arkansas (poultry), Iowa (beef and pork), and California 
(wine, fruits, and nuts). Russia’s accession to the WTO will help 
ensure that Russia’s markets remain open and will curtail the 
hassles that US firms confront when they ship beef, pork, or 
poultry to Russia, particularly with regard to sanitary and phyto-
sanitary (SPS) measures. Accession will also constrain the room 
for maneuver by the Russian Ministry of Agriculture to invoke 
trade  restrictions  based  on  SPS  considerations  that  are  not 
anchored on science-based criteria. The limit on Russia’s total 
trade-distorting agricultural support will be capped at $9 billion 
in 2012 and then gradually reduced to $4.4 billion by 2018. 
Meanwhile no agricultural export subsidies will be permitted. 
Manufacturing 
Russia’s WTO accession and PNTR will open doors for US 
manufacturing firms, particularly in high-technology products 
such as pharmaceuticals and aircraft. Russia relies on foreign 
manufactures for the majority of its domestic supply of drugs 
(77 percent) and medical devices (60 percent) (Coalition for 
US-Russia  Trade  2011).  US  manufacturers  already  have  a 
strong position in the Russian market (supplying 25 percent 
of Russian medical devices and 5 percent of pharmaceuticals), 
with  Pfizer  alone  exporting  $164  million  worth  in  2008. 
Immediately  following  WTO  accession,  Russian  tariffs  on 
imported pharmaceuticals will fall from 15 percent to around 
6 percent, creating much greater market access for US firms. 
Robust growth in the Russian economy will benefit US exports 
of industrial machinery equipment such as tractors, oil and 
gas field equipment, hydraulic hand tools, and transportation 
vehicles. Texas, Iowa, and Illinois have already realized gains 
in exports of specialized machinery to Russia. Russia’s devel-
opment of its natural resources (forestry, agriculture, mining, 
and  energy)  will  provide  additional  opportunities  for  US 
producers of capital goods. 
Since 2001, new export opportunities in “transportation 
equipment”—a  category  that  includes  automobiles,  trucks, 
and  spacecraft—have  boosted  exports  not  only  for  such 
obvious industrial states as Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin 
but  also  for  Washington,  Arizona,  and Tennessee.  Russia’s 
WTO accession and PNTR will improve conditions for direct 
investment by US auto firms in Russia. This will enable US 
firms to export a wide range of parts and components and to 
earn investment income on operations in Russia. 
PNTR will ensure that the best available 
trade and investment conditions of access 
to the Russian market offered to foreign 
firms are also offered to US firms. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 2 0   N o v e m b e r   2 0 1 1
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Box 1     Impact on the US economy
n  Qualitative gains
n  Accession will prevent Russia from arbitrarily raising tariffs and invoking nontariff barrier (NTB) protec-
tionist measures in the future. During the Great Recession of 2008–09, Russia hiked tariffs on numerous 
manufactured imports (Hufbauer, Kirkegaard, and Wong 2010). Once Russia’s tariff schedule is “bound” 
in the WTO, this sort of arbitrary action will no longer be possible. 
n  In future trade remedy cases, Russia will have to follow WTO safeguard, countervailing duty, and anti-
dumping duty procedures, observing established procedures with open hearings. 
n  Quantitative gains
n  In 2010, the United States was the destination of only 3 percent of Russian exports and the source of 
just 4 percent of Russian imports. 
n  Between 2005 and 2010 total bilateral trade between the United States and Russia doubled.1 The next 
five years should see a similar increase; our estimates indicate a doubling or more of Russia’s external 
trade following WTO accession, assuming strong Russian economic performance.
n  The associated increase in Russia’s inward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock (estimated to be 50 
percent) would trigger a further increase in total Russian two-way trade in manufactures. Good Russian 
economic performance will further enlarge two-way commerce. 
n  Russia has committed to binding its applied tariffs on detailed tariff lines. The average weighted applied 








Dairy products 19.8 14.9
Cereals 15.1 10.0
Oilseeds and oils 9.0 7.1
Automobiles 15.5 12.0
Electrical machinery 8.4 6.2
Wood and paper 13.4 8.0
Chemicals 6.5 5.2
n  Increased market access for US agricultural exports
n  Russia is the world’s second largest import market for beef and pork and has historically been the 
largest importer of US poultry. Consumer spending on food grew by 70 percent between 2002 and 
2008 and is predicted to keep growing rapidly. 
n  WTO accession will ensure that the United States enjoys the same access to Russian agricultural markets 
as its leading competitors such as Brazil and the European Union. In the absence of WTO accession, 
Russia will be free to discriminate against US exports. 
1. Even when oil is excluded from trade, total bilateral trade between the United States and Russia still doubled. 
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High Technology 
Russia  has  committed  itself  to  joining  the  Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA) upon accession to the WTO, 
and it will allow information technology (IT) imports to enter 
Russia duty free. No licenses will be required for imports of 
more than a dozen encryption technology products. California 
and Massachusetts have tapped Russian markets in software, 
computers, and electronic equipment, while Washington state 
and others have taken advantage of better access for aircraft 
exports and Microsoft products. Some of the concessions the 
United States has secured from Russia in its 2006 Bilateral 
Market  Access  Agreement  with  respect  to  such  matters  as 
aircraft tariffs will be enjoyed by US firms only if Congress 
passes PNTR. However, membership in the WTO on equal 
terms with Russia will enhance the position of US high-tech 
exporters and improve conditions for additional investment 
in Russia.
Services 
The United States is very competitive in a wide range of services 
industries, from finance to education to retailing, as noted by 
J. Bradford Jensen (2011) in his recent book. Russia’s WTO 
accession will enable qualified firms to establish a commercial 
presence through their investment stakes. A large number of 
specific commitments have been made in this sector. 
For  telecommunications  the  foreign  equity  limitation 
of 49 percent will be eliminated four years after accession. 
Foreign  insurance  companies  will  be  allowed  to  establish 
branches nine years after Russia accedes. Foreign banks will 
be allowed to establish subsidiaries, and there will be no cap 
on foreign equity in individual banking institutions, though 
the overall foreign capital participation in the Russian banking 
system will be limited to 50 percent. Russia will allow 100 
percent  foreign-owned  companies  to  engage  in  wholesale, 
retail, and franchise sectors upon accession to the WTO. 
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Box 1     Impact on the US economy (continued)
n  Revised Russian sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations will help ensure that any trade restric-
tions are based on scientific criteria.
n  Under these liberalized conditions, US agricultural exports to Russia are expected to double or triple 
within a few years of WTO accession.
n  Increased opportunities for US industrial exports
n  Industrial goods already account for 86 percent of US merchandise exports to Russia; however, the US 
export structure has become more diversified in recent years, with significant increases in exports of 
aircraft, motor vehicles, and sundry equipment. 
n  Tariffs on the sale of civil aircraft will be reduced from 20 percent to single digits; tariffs on civil aircraft 
parts will drop to an average of 5 percent. 
n  Russia is the largest importer of pharmaceuticals among the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). 
Currently, US exports to Russia are only $70 million, a fraction of its pharmaceutical exports to the 
other BRICs. 
n  Russia has agreed to reduce its export duties on steel scrap (an important input for US steel mills) to 
one-third of their current levels. 
n  Significant liberalization of banking, finance, and other services
n  Under WTO accession, Russia will allow 100 percent foreign ownership of banks, securities firms, and 
nonlife insurance firms. 
n  Russia agreed to open its telecommunication services market to all foreign suppliers and allow compa-
nies to operate as 100 percent foreign-owned enterprises. 
n  These commitments on liberalization will become effective immediately upon accession.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 2 0   N o v e m b e r   2 0 1 1
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But PNTR holds the key to enabling US firms to enjoy 
Russia’s market-opening commitments and greater regulatory 
transparency in these sectors. Services exports are likely to 
increase at least as fast as merchandise trade, and with time, 
Russia’s  accession  will  likely  present  new  opportunities  in 
other services sectors, such as energy and professional services.
Why a US ConGreSSional Vote iS CritiCal 
for the United StateS to reaP theSe 
BenefitS 
Russia  is  not  only  the  largest  economy  outside  the  WTO 
but  also  the  only  one  with  which  the  United  States  does 
not have PNTR (often called “most favored nation”) status. 
While congressional approval is not necessary for completion 
of Russian accession to the WTO,  Congress needs to grant 
Russia PNTR by repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment so 
that US companies can take full advantage of the best available 
conditions of access to the Russian market for both trade and 
investment.
  The  Jackson-Vanik  Amendment  to  the  US Trade  Act 
of 1974 was approved at the height of the Cold War, when 
Russia generated outrage by barring Jews from emigrating. 
It was sponsored by Senator Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson of 
Washington and Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio. Free 
emigration for Russian Jews, however, has not been in question 
since Russia became independent in 1991. The amendment is 
an outdated remnant of the politics of a distant era, though it 
remains a major irritant in relations between Washington and 
Moscow and a political issue in Congress. Many lawmakers, 
citing a range of disagreements with Russia over human and 
legal rights in Russia and various foreign policy issues, say that 
refusal to lift Jackson-Vanik would send a signal of displeasure 
over these matters. But other tools exist for exerting pressure 
on Russia that would be more effective and far less destructive 
to US economic interests. The US government has alterna-
tive bilateral and multilateral mechanisms that can be used 
to  engage  Russia  on  human  rights  questions  and  political 
and  religious  freedoms,  such  as  the  US-Russia  Bilateral 
Presidential Commission and the Organization for Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe.  If  necessary,  economic  sanc-
tions and tailored penalties, including draconian measures, 
are  readily  available  under  other  US  statutes,  such  as  the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
Originally, Jackson-Vanik applied to almost all commu-
nist countries. Over time, nearly all of them were “graduated” 
when they joined the WTO. Most entered the WTO without 
having  previously  secured  PNTR  from  the  United  States. 
Only Ukraine, which became a WTO member in 2008, was 
graduated by Congress in March 2006 in advance of its WTO 
accession.  All  but  Moldova  have  eventually  been  granted 
PNTR (Pregelj 2005).
The irony is that annual waivers of Russia and others from 
the trade penalties imposed by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
have been a fact of life for more than 20 years. Russia was 
originally granted most favored nation status in 1992 under 
the US-Soviet Bilateral Trade Relations Agreement of 1991. 
Even  so,  for  Russian  exports  to  continue  entering  the  US 
market at normal tariff rates, the US president must either 
grant an annual waiver or issue a semiannual report certifying 
that  Russia  is  in  compliance  with  the  freedom  of  emigra-
tion provisions in Section 402 of Title IV of the Trade Act 
of 1974 (the formal name of Jackson-Vanik). The US presi-
dent or the Secretary of State has issued such a waiver or 
report finding Russia to be in compliance with the freedom 
of emigration requirements every year since 1994. There has 
been no recorded vote in Congress challenging these decisions 
(US-Russia Business Council and AmCham Russia 2005).
Some  Americans  object  to  granting  PNTR  to  Russia, 
citing foreign policy grounds. They may disapprove of Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin, who has signaled his intention to 
return to the presidency next year. But trade penalties in the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment are too blunt an instrument for 
normal diplomatic use. If they were to be used, the United 
States  might  impose  Depression-era  Smoot-Hawley  import 
tariffs of up to 50 percent on Russian goods, which would 
stop all such imports. 
Can the United States simply continue to operate under 
the  biannual  waiver  and  report  process?  It  cannot.  Under 
WTO  rules,  that  is  not  allowed.  Congress  must  establish 
“permanent”  normal  trade  relations,  not  just  normal  trade 
relations to be renewed regularly. Moreover, for Russia, this 
is  an  issue  of  principle:  whether  to  live  under  the  burden 
of continuous review by Congress or to be taken out of the 
shadow of an obsolete stigma. Regardless of whether the issue 
is one of principle or international trade rules, the bottom line 
is that rejection of PNTR would backfire and US trade with 
Russia would immediately become potentially worse than the 
status quo. Russia, for example, would be likely to retaliate 
by adopting very narrow and stringent interpretations of its 
obligations  under  the  two  existing  bilateral  agreements  on 
trade with the United States—the US-Russia Bilateral Trade 
Relations Agreement and the 2006 Bilateral Market Access 
Agreement. 
A vote against PNTR would require the United States 
to invoke the “nonapplication” provision of the Marrakesh 
Agreement, which created the WTO. “Nonapplication” means 
that the WTO rulebook does not apply to trade between the N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 2 0   N o v e m b e r   2 0 1 1
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United States and Russia. In response, Russia might withhold 
most favored nation treatment for US exports of goods and 
services not covered by the bilateral agreements. Russia would 
thereby  deny  US  firms  the  full  benefits  negotiated  by  the 
United States and other governments in the WTO accession 
process over the past 18 years. US firms and workers would be 
placed at a disadvantage, possibly for years to come. 
In addition, by voting “no” on PNTR, the US Congress 
would be missing an opportunity to support liberal voices 
within the Russian government who advocate political and 
economic engagement with the West. Over the last three years, 
the US “reset” policy toward Russia has revived US-Russia 
relations and has already resulted in the ratification of a new 
bilateral  Strategic  Arms  Reduction Treaty  and  the  Civilian 
Nuclear  Agreement,  both  in  December  2010.  Russia  has 
opened the Northern Delivery Network to Afghanistan and 
joined in supporting some UN Security Council Resolutions 
that put economic pressure on Iran to desist from its effort to 
acquire nuclear weapons. 
Another  danger  is  that  a  “no”  vote  on  PNTR  would 
provide fresh arguments to a large group of Russians who 
believe that the West (and the United States in particular) 
disdains  a  “relationship  of  equals”  with  Russia  and  simply 
cannot be trusted. As President Obama said, “Russia’s WTO 
accession would be yet another important step forward in our 
reset of relations with Russia, which has been based upon the 
belief that the United States and Russia share many common 
interests, even as we disagree on some issues.” It is time to 
move beyond the discord of the past and into a new regime 
that would function not only on trust but on economic inter-
dependence and benefits as well. 
hoW rUSSia differS from China
One objection to PNTR for Russia is the parallel that some 
draw with PNTR for China. President Bill Clinton signed 
the law granting PNTR to China in 2000 after debate over 
China’s human rights and economic practices. But whatever 
the arguments about China, before or after PNTR, few apply 
to Russia. Economically, the two countries are vastly different, 
and US and Russian interests in the WTO are surprisingly 
complementary, sharply contrasting with current US concerns 
about China.
Among the big emerging markets—Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and Mexico—Russia has the highest GDP per capita 
both in dollar and purchasing power parity terms. Its GDP 
per capita in current US dollars in 2010 was more than three 
times higher than China’s (see table 1). Goldman Sachs fore-
casts that Russia will be the only one of the big emerging 
markets to approach the per capita income levels of developed 
European countries by 2050. This status has many important 
consequences for trade with the United States.
 Far from fearing foreign goods, Russia looks on WTO 
accession as a way to expose its industries to more import 
competition,  which  Russian  economists  hope  will  enhance 
efficiency and mitigate inflation, currently at 6 percent. Given 
that Russia has a larger current account surplus than it desires, 
the government is interested in raising imports. 
World Bank economists Thomas Rutherford and David 
Tarr (2010) have estimated that the Russian economy would 
gain 3.7 percent of GDP from WTO accession in the medium 
term (five years) and 11 percent of GDP in the long term. 
These gains are likely to derive predominantly from liberaliza-
tion, resulting in increased competition in business services 
and foreign direct investment. 
Moreover, since 90 percent of Russia’s exports consist of 
commodities, mainly oil and natural gas, which encounter no 
trade barriers, Russia has few problems with market access. 
Russian exports are thus not expected to increase much with 
WTO entry. 
In addition, Russia also hopes to attract more foreign 
direct investment. For many US companies active in Russia, 
notably in the automotive industry, food industry, and forestry, 
large-scale exports from the United States to Russia are not 
a realistic option because of expensive land transportation. 
Therefore, they can operate only through direct investments 
in Russia, and they need deliveries of components and critical 
machinery from the United States. 
Another contrast to China is that Russia is not likely to 
become a significant exporter of manufactures for the foresee-
able future, because the country has an exceptionally strong 
comparative advantage in exporting commodities and because 
of high costs Russia’s exports of manufactured goods are not 
competitive in world markets. 
On the other side of the trade balance sheet, the sophistica-
tion, income levels, and tastes of Russian consumers make the 
country attractive to US exporters of merchandise and services. 
Russia’s middle class accounts for 30 percent of the population, 
and foreign brands are their top choices. In terms of social indi-
cators like health and education, Russia is slightly ahead of Brazil 
It is time to move beyond the discord of 
the past and into a new regime that would 
function not only on trust but on economic 
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and Mexico in most—but head and shoulders above China and 
India. Most impressively, in 2008, no fewer than 77 percent of 
college-age Russians received some college education, compared 
with 23 percent of Chinese (according to the World Bank). 
Moreover, 51 percent of young Russians actually completed a 
first college degree, compared with only 11 percent of Chinese. 
Another difference between China and Russia is their atti-
tude to the protection of intellectual property rights. Unlike 
China, Russia is a significant high-end producer of software with 
a strong interest and track record in protecting software patents 
and copyrights. According to Keith Crane and Artur Usanov 
(2010), “intellectual property rights are not a major impediment 
[…] countries have been able to prevent product theft success-
fully.” Russia has several outstanding internet companies, and 40 
percent of the population has access to the internet.
Finally, currency issues are not likely to cause the prob-
lems that plague US relations with China, which intervenes 
in currency markets to keep the yuan undervalued, making its 
exports artificially cheap and imports expensive. In the past 
Russia has pegged its exchange rate, but since 2009 the Russian 
ruble  has  floated  relatively  freely  against  other  currencies. 
Today Russia has larger international reserves than it desires 
because of the unexpectedly elevated oil price and intends to 
let its current account surplus shrink toward balance, boosting 
its import demand. 
The United States has so far not taken advantage of its 
opportunities to develop the US-Russian bilateral trade rela-
tionship, particularly with regard to US exports. US two-way 
trade with China in 2010 was almost 12 times larger than with 
Russia and the comparative ratio reaches 22 times when energy 
trade is excluded. While US imports from Russia are rapidly 
catching up with US imports from India and Brazil, US exports 
to Russia (in 2008) were still only one-half of US exports to 
India and less than one-third of US exports to Brazil.
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